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AUTHORITY

AGO D/A ltr, 29 Apr 1980

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9 January 1968

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2. Information contained in this report is provided to insure appropriate benefits in the future from Lessons Learned during current operations, and may be adapted for use in developing training material.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY:

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KENNETH G. WICKHAM
Major General, USA
The Adjutant General

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS 7TH BATTALION 13TH ARTILLERY
APO 96368

AVGK-AA-O

1 August 1967

SUBJECT: Operational Report for Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967 (U)

TO: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SECTION 1 (U) Significant Organization or Unit Activities

1. (U)General: This battalion at the end of the past quarter completed its 264th consecutive day in sustained combat operations. During the quarter the entire effort of the battalion has been in support of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. The normal disposition of the organic batteries has one battery supporting each of the three Brigades of the Division, however, at times all three batteries have supported one Brigade. The normal missions have been GSR or reinforcing the fires of one or more of the Direct Support Artillery Battalions, but on many occasions the batteries have assumed the role of a Direct Support Battery. In addition to the organic batteries the battalion had an 8" Howitzer/175mm Gun Battery attached for 85 days through the end of the quarter. The support rendered by the 8"/175mm battery has been divided between the 1st Air Cavalry Division, 4th Infantry Division and Capitol ROK Infantry Division.

2. (U)Intelligence: Target acquisition by the battalion has been greatly enhanced with the commitment of both battalion aerial observers to the Reconnaissance Squadron of the 1st Air Cavalry Division. In addition, three forward observer teams have been committed to the 1st Air Cavalry Division maneuver elements. The battalion remains primarily dependent upon other agencies for intelligence data. All available intelligence is consolidated at the battalion and an INSUM is published for the batteries weekly.

3. (U) Operations and Training: a. The battalion remained attached to the 41st Artillery Group and the entire battalion throughout the quarter has been under the operational control of the 1st Air Cavalry Division supporting Operation Pershing.

b. Operational requirements permitting each battery conducts a minimum of one hour of fire direction and firing battery training each day. During this training emphasis is placed on the training of newly assigned personnel and cross-training of all personnel within a section. All units have concentrated on air mobile training. This training included capabilities of air mobile items, rigging of equipment, and techniques for air movement. During the past quarter each firing battery has made at least one tactical move by CH-47.

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c. The battalion dismantled and moved its base camp for the third time since arriving in Vietnam. The move was completed in a period of ten days without degrading or detracting from the accomplishment of the battalion's operational mission. This move marked the second time that base camp has been located at Phu Cat Air Force Base in the past seven months.

d. The highlight of the operations during the past quarter has been participation in seven artillery raids in the Pershing AO. Those raids have proven to the enemy that there is no place in the Pershing AO where he is safe from the destructive firepower of artillery. The 1/9 Cavalry Squadron continues to provide security for the fire bases and aerial reconnaissance over the target area. The fast reaction times by the batteries of this battalion and the 1/9 Cavalry Squadron have resulted in the immediate response to all available intelligence. The relationship between the 13th Artillery and the 1/9 Cavalry Squadron is the equivalent of that normally found between a direct support battalion and its supported brigade. When the Cavalry Squadron needs artillery support for any of its varied missions it asks for and expects to be supported by a battery of this battalion.

e. The following is a chronological sequence of major events during the quarter to include the posture of the battalion at the beginning and the end of the quarter:

- 1 May 67 - Hqs 7/13 OPCON 1st Cav Div at LZ Two Bits with a mission of GS.
Btry A 7/13 Arty OPCON 1st Cav Div at LZ English with a mission of GS.
Btry B 7/13 Arty OPCON 1st Cav Div at LZ Tom with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty.
Btry C 7/13 Arty OPCON 1st Cav Div at LZ Two Bits with a mission of GSR 1/21 Arty
- 2 May 67 - Btry A 7/13 Arty airlifted to LZ Sandra with a mission of GSR 1/21 Arty.
- 4 May 67 - Btry B 7/13 Arty moved by road to LZ Pony with a mission of GSR 1/21 Arty.
- 7 May 67 - Btry A 3/18 Arty attached in place at LZ English with a mission of GS.
- 8 May 67 - Two 175mm guns detached, moved by road south of An Khe for a special mission.
- 10 May 67 - Battalion fired round number 100,000 since arrival in Vietnam.
- 11 May 67 - Two 175mm guns returned to LZ English with a mission of GS and two 8" howitzers moved to LZ Uplift with a mission of GSR 1/77 Arty.
- 15 May 67 - Hqs moved to LZ English by road with a mission of GS.

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- 22 May 67 - Two 175mm guns moved to LZ Pony with a mission of GS
- 25 May 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Putter for an artillery raid.
- 4 Jun 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted 4 tubes into LZ Doug for an artillery raid.
- 20 Jun 67 - Btry A 3/18 Arty attached to 41st Arty Group and moved to Oasis to support elements of the 4th Inf Div. Btry C 7/13 Arty moved by road to LZ Uplift with a mission of GSR 1/77 Arty.
- 25 Jun 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty moved by road to LZ Tom with a mission of reinforcing 2/19 Arty
- 26 Jun 67 - Btry B 7/13 Arty moved by road to LZ Tom with a mission of reinforcing 2/19 Arty. Btry C 7/13 Arty moved by road to LZ Two Bits with a mission of GSR 2/19 Arty.
- 29 Jun 67 - Base camp completed movement from Camp Townes to Phu Cat AFB.
- 1 Jul 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty moved by road to LZ Pony with a mission of GSR 1/77 Arty.
- 2 Jul 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Canister for an artillery raid.
- 6 Jul 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Canister for an artillery raid returning to LZ Two Bits with a mission of GSR 1/77 Arty.
- 9 Jul 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty moved by road to LZ Pony with a mission of GSR 1/77 Arty.
- 10 Jul 67 - Btry A 3/18 Arty moved to Qui Nhon by road and to Tung Ro by sea to support the Capitol ROK Infantry Division.
- 11 Jul 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted 4 tubes into LZ Paddle for an Artillery raid.
- 12 Jul 67 - Btry B 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Garnet for an artillery raid.
- 15 Jul 67 - Battalion fired round number 150,000 since arrival in Vietnam.
- 22 Jul 67 - Btry C 7/13 Arty airlifted into LZ Mendenhall for an artillery raid.

f. The organic batteries of this battalion have fired a total of 77,958 rounds during the reporting period. The known results of all missions fired are as follows: 42 VC KIA (body count), 8 NVA KIA (body count), 41 huts destroyed, 34 huts damaged and 11 bunkers destroyed.

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g. The following is a breakdown of missions fired by type since 1 May 67:

<u>TYPE MISSION</u>	<u>NUMBER</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
H&I	5645	71.2
Neutralization	626	7.9
Defensive Targets	511	6.2
Registration	202	2.7
Illumination	413	5.3
Preparations	64	1.0
TOT's	143	5.7
Total	<u>7934</u>	<u>100.0</u>

4. (U) Logistics: There has been no change in the status of logistical support for this battalion in the reporting period. Class I, III and V supplies are drawn through the 1st Air Cavalry Division (AM) Forward Support Element. The main source for Class II and IV supplies is the Qui Nhon Support Command Depot, however limited quantities of these classes may be drawn from the Forward Support Element to meet immediate demands. All classes of supplies are received in adequate quantities and in a timely fashion.

5. (U) Maintenance : a. Signal maintenance has been furnished to this battalion by the 1st Air Cavalry Division 27th Maintenance Battalion and 13th Signal Battalion except for maintenance of the AN/GRC 46 radio teletype. This item of equipment is not in the 1st Air Cavalry Division's inventory. The deadline rate for signal equipment where maintenance support has been furnished by the 1st Air Cavalry Division elements has been nominal. Signal maintenance support furnished by Qui Nhon Support Command elements is adequate however it is not timely because of the distance separating this battalions area of operation and Qui Nhon.

b. On 15 June 1967 because of a reorganization of maintenance support in the Qui Nhon area the 560th Maintenance Company was designated to handle all field maintenance for this battalion except for signal maintenance. This company recently deployed from the CONUS and does not have adequate repair parts on hand to affect timely repairs. The company is located at LZ English and is exceptionally responsive except in cases where the repair parts or float items are not on hand.

c. This battalion with the assistance of the support maintenance facilities conducts periodic technical inspections to detect potential problem areas and to keep the battalion commander abreast of the status of maintenance within the battalion. Bi-monthly the battalion conducts a technical inspection of all motor vehicles, generators, and shop operating procedures. Deficiencies are corrected on the spot by either battery or battalion maintenance personnel. Support maintenance conducts a monthly inspection of artillery fire control and armament and a quarterly inspection of small arms and crew served weapons. This program has contributed significantly to the loss deadline rate maintained by this battalion.

SECTION 2 (U) Commanders Observations and Recommendations

Part I Observations

1. Personnel:

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Discussion: During March, April and May 1967, 185 of a total of 386 enlisted men who were in the original rotational hump of this battalion were infused with other units. The entire infusion program was directed and coordinated by the AG Personnel Section, I Field Force Vietnam which had been furnished a roster of personnel to be infused. Initially, small groups of two to six individuals at a time were reassigned to other artillery units subordinate to I Field Forces. This system was abandoned in late March when the other artillery units chose to curtail tours of personnel to reduce their rotational humps rather than to continue with an infusion program. Prior to this time, I Field Force Artillery had not permitted curtailments of tours as a means of reducing rotation humps. This battalion decided not to curtail tours since 54 enlisted men who were in the original rotational hump had voluntarily extended their tours in order to remain with the unit. It was felt that it would have been unfair to these men to curtail the tours of their contemporaries who had chosen not to extend. By this time, 57 enlisted men had already been infused. I Field Forces then turned to II Field Forces and ultimately to the 9th Infantry Division for a source of replacements for infusion. Coordination was effected directly by I Field Force with the 9th Infantry Division and transportation arrangements were made by I Field Force. Five groups of personnel, totaling 128 enlisted men, were exchanged during May with the largest group numbering 61 men. The greatest problem encountered was the coordination of air travel. Diversion of scheduled aircraft resulted in a delay of three days from 15 to 18 May in arrival of the first group from the 9th Infantry Division. The aircraft taking the first group from this battalion to the 9th Replacement Company at Bear Cat (Long Thanh) on 20 May terminated at Tun Son Nhut instead of Bear Cat. It was four days before that group was located by the 9th Replacement Company and taken to Bear Cat. The groups scheduled to arrive from the 9th Infantry Division on 23 and 25 May both arrived on 26 May, causing transportation, billeting and mess problems since the arrival of the 26 May group had not been announced in advance. The incoming personnel and their baggage had to be shuttled from the air terminal; additional tents had to be erected to house them; and sufficient Class A rations were not available to feed them all.

Observations: Infusion of personnel should be restricted to units subordinate to the same major headquarters to reduce the probability that air travel will have to be used between units. Problems in coordination are thereby minimized, smaller groups of personnel can be processed at any one time, and obviously, a considerable monetary saving results from non-utilization of aircraft.

b. If infusion must be accomplished between major commands Headquarters USARV, should act as the primary coordinating headquarters. USARV is in a better position than any major subordinate commands to arrange for and to control group movements of personnel by aircraft between Corps Tactical Zones.

2. Operations:

a. Item: Computation of Velocity Error

Discussion: Quite often firing batteries are located at altitudes that are as much as 600 meters above the MIP. Table D of the tabular firing tables contains corrections for a maximum height difference of + or - 390. With the

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conventional metro message sufficient data is not available for the accurate computation of a velocity error.

Observations: The above problem can be solved by using a "mountain metro". The metro station uses the 500M altitude as the MDP and the message is computed using 500M altitude as the starting point. The "mountain met" is broadcast every six hours, fifteen minutes after the regular met is broadcast.

b. Item: Use of Range "K"

Discussion: Because of the location of friendly elements, availability of aircraft and other limiting factors it is impossible to obtain a GFT or an average VE for all charges. All artillery units should fire the best data available on all missions and to fire a "closed stick" is the least desirable data.

Observation: This battalion has had very good results from using a range "K" factor when firing charges where no GFT or VE is available. The total range correction per thousand meters from a registration is obtained from the charge above or below the charge to be fired. Using this correction factor a GFT setting may be constructed for the charge in question. This data should not be used to replace a registration. A registration should be conducted as soon as possible.

c. Item: Firing multiple caliber weapons.

Discussion: Because of the nature of the war and the alignment of artillery necessary to support the battle area, it is often necessary for a battalion to control the fires of units with varying caliber of weapons.

Observations: Battalion fire direction personnel must be prepared to control the fires of all caliber weapons. These personnel should become familiar with the peculiarities of fire control equipment and fire direction procedures for all artillery weapons.

d. Item: Defensive Target Designations.

Discussion: As a general rule, company or platoon size infantry units will designate their defensive targets by a radio callsign with a numerical suffix; i.e. Quick Silver 1. These targets are normally fired each day. When the infantry element moves, the defensive target designation will remain with the moving unit, however the grid of the defensive target will obviously change based on the new location of the infantry unit.

Observations: Firing elements must be sure that the old defensive target is discarded and only the latest grid is kept on hand for quick fire purposes.

3. Other:

a. Item: Loose Hand Grenades.

Discussion: During a recent mortar attack on a firing battery a mortar round landed near some M-26 hand grenades. The heat and blast from the mortar round would have undoubtedly detonated the grenades causing additional casualties had the grenades not been in their original storage containers.

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Observation: When not in actual use fragmentation grenades should be kept in their original storage containers and given additional protection.

b. Item: Blast Walls

Discussion: Casualties can be caused by fragments from a mortar round that impacts near the air vent of an underground bunker even if the vent is above the heads of occupants. The casualties are caused by the ricochet of fragments from the top of the opening and bunker ceiling.

Observation: A blast wall should be constructed outside of all openings in bunkers.

c. Item: Suspended Ammunition Lots

Discussion: This battalion has had as many as four days lapse between the suspension of ammunition and the receipt of the suspended lot message. Any delay in the dissemination of suspended ammunition could result in a serious artillery incident.

Observation: The suspension of ammunition should be transmitted to the firing units by the most expeditious means.

d. Item: Loss of Communications During A Mortar Attack.


Discussion: During a mortar attack the first instinct of individuals in the open is to take cover. The RTO at the gun section unless he is properly stationed will take cover and leave his telephone in the gun parapet. The result is a loss of communications with certain elements of the firing battery.

Observation: The RTO for each howitzer should be positioned as close as possible to the personnel bunker in case of an attack and instructed to carry the phone into the personnel bunker during a mortar attack.

Part II Recommendations:

1. Personnel: Infusion of personnel should be accomplished only between units of the same major headquarters.

2. Other: The procedures for collecting and disseminating information concerning suspended ammunition lots should be examined to insure that it is timely.


DONALD J. MAJIKAS
LTC, Artillery
Commanding

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
4 CG, IFFORCV Arty
3 HQs USARV
2 USARPAC

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AVGK-CO (1 August 1967) 1st Ind
SUBJECT. Operational Report for quarterly Period Ending 31
July 1967 Report Control Symbol CSFOR-65

HEADQUARTERS 41ST ARTILLERY GROUP, APO 96368, 14 August 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Forces Vietnam Artillery,
APO 96350

In compliance with I Field Forces Vietnam Reg 1-3 dated
23 March 1967, the Operational Report for quarterly Period
ending 31 July 1967 from 7th Battalion 13th Artillery is approved
and forwarded


S.H. WHEELER
Colonel, Artillery
Commanding

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AVFA-AT-D (1 Aug 67)

2d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned for Quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967, (RCS CSFOR-65)(UIC WFNDA)(7th Bn, 13th Arty)(U)

HEADQUARTERS I FIELD FORCE VIETNAM ARTILLERY, APO 96350 25 August 1967

TO: Commanding General, I Field Force Vietnam, ATTN: AVFA-GC-OT, APO 96350

1. Concur in the observations and recommendations contained in the basic communications except as noted in paragraph 2 below.

2. Reference Section II, Part II, paragraph 1. Nonconcur. All units in Vietnam require infusion and it is not always feasible to infuse just with units in the immediate area or under the same major headquarters. Any major headquarters has the capability to make arrangements for aircraft support and to control group movements throughout Vietnam.

3. Ammunition Suspension notices indicate that notices originating at USARV take 2-7 days to arrive at Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery. Although the messages are assigned a precedence of priority, the delay is lengthy. Headquarters, I Field Force Vietnam Artillery telephones the suspensions to subordinate units in the field upon receipt and follows with a hard copy retransmission.

4. The requirements outlined in paragraph 12a(1) AR 1-19 will be reemphasized for future reports.

5. 7th Bn, 13th Arty UIC is WFNDA.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

t/LEO E. ELLIS
LTC, Arty
Adjutant

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AVFA-CC-OT (1 Aug 67)

3d Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report - Lessons Learned for quarterly Period Ending
31 July 1967, (RCS C-200-65)(TIC 101A)(7th Bn, 13th Arty)(U)

13 HEADQUARTERS, I FIELD FORCE, VIETNAM, APO 96350 1 SEP 1967

TO: Commanding General, United States Army Vietnam, APO 96375

This headquarters has reviewed the 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery Operational Report of Lessons Learned for the quarterly period ending 31 July 1967. Pertinent comments follow: Reference paragraph 1, Section II, Part II (page 7) - Commander's Recommendations: Non-concur. The infusion of personnel should be accomplished between units throughout USARV. Control of the infusion program should be exercised by Headquarters, USARV and infusion directed to insure that no more than 25% of any unit rotates in one month. Those individuals selected for infusion between units should be thoroughly oriented as to why assignment to other units is necessary. Transportation and exchange of equipment should be managed by USARV to make the move to the new unit as simple as possible.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

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nc


KEARNEY G. SILVIUS

CAPTAIN, AGC
ASST AG -

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AVHGC-DST (1 Aug 67) 4th Ind
SUBJECT: Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the Period Ending
31 July 1967 (RCS CSFOR-65) (U)

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES ARMY VIETNAM, APO San Francisco 96375 17 OCT 1967

TO: Commander in Chief, United States Army, Pacific, ATTN: GPOP-OT,
APO 96558

1. (U) This headquarters has reviewed the Operational Report-Lessons Learned for the period ending 31 July 1967 from Headquarters, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery (FNDA) as indorsed.

2. (FOUO) Pertinent comments follow:

a. Reference item concerning infusion: Paragraph 1, page 4; paragraph 1, page 7; paragraph 2, 2d Indorsement and 3d Indorsement. Concur with comment made in 3d Indorsement.

(1) An infusion plan is presently under development at this headquarters. Its scope will encompass all units experiencing rotational humps which are problems and cannot be solved internally by the units.

(2) Individuals to be infused will be identified and their name, grade, MOS, and TOF line item number will be placed in an infusion pool. Rosters of the units identifying those personnel spaces to be infused will then become a requirement list, and will be matched and filled from the pool with personnel having DEROS other than during the month of criticality. This headquarters will direct and monitor this Infusion Program.

b. Reference item concerning suspended ammunition lots, paragraph 2, page 7, paragraph 3c, page 7 and paragraph 3, 2d Indorsement: Concur. Effective 1 September 1967 this headquarters directed 1st Logistical Command to act as the central agency for the dissemination of ammunition suspensions and related actions. This should result in more rapid service.

3. (U) Unit will be notified of actions and comments by routine indorsement which returns this report.

FOR THE COMMANDER:


Major, AGC

Asst. Adjutant General

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GPOP-DT(1 Aug 67)

5th Ind

SUBJECT: Operational Report for the Quarterly Period Ending 31 July 1967
from HQ, 7th Bn, 13th Arty (UIC: WFNDAA) (RCS CSFOR-65)

HQ, US ARMY, PACIFIC, APO San Francisco 96558 6 DEC 1967

TO: Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development, Department of the
Army, Washington, D. C. 20310

This headquarters has evaluated subject report and forwarding
indorsements and concurs in the report as indorsed.

FOR THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF:



K. F. OSBOURN
MAJ, AGC
Asst AG

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CO, 7th Battalion, 13th Artillery

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